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ABSTRACT 
In a stochastic pure endowment economy with money but no financial markets, two 
types of agents trade one non-durable good using two alternative types of cash 
constraints. Simulations of the corresponding variants are compared to Arrow-
Debreu and Autarky equilibriums. First, this illustrates how financial innovation or 
financial regression, including systemic risk, may arise in a neo-classical model with 
rational expectations and may or may not be countered. Second, the price and 
money partition dynamics that the two variants generate absent any macroeconomic 
shock, exhibit jumps as well as fat-tails and vary depending on the discount rate.  
Keywords: Financial development, Systemic Risk, Heterogeneity, Rational expectations, 
Monetary model, Cash constraints 
JEL classification: E44 5
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Non-Technical Summary 
In this stochastic pure endowment economy with money but no financial markets, two 
types of agents trade one non-durable good under cash constraints. In a first variant, a 
cash-in-advance constraint “à la Clower” (1967) forces agents to own all the cash needed 
for settling upcoming purchases before the start of trading. In the second variant, a cash-
at-the-end-of-the-day constraint allows agents to settle their transactions only once 
overall trading has ended.  Simulations of these two variants are compared to the 
outcome of two more models.  In the so-called Autarky model, each of our two agents 
lives in “autarky” i.e. transact in a separate centralized market with agents of his/her kind 
instead of sharing a centralized good market with the other type of agents. A shift from 
one of the Variants to this Autarky constitutes a financial regression. In the so-called 
Arrow-Debreu model, by contrast, markets are complete and centralized; i.e. agents can 
trade their endowments before the start of transactions.  Moving from one of the Variants 
to the Arrow-Debreu model constitutes a financial innovation.
This illustrates how financial innovation or financial regression, including systemic risk, 
may arise in a neo-classical model with rational expectations and may or may not be 
countered. First, sufficient incentives and the corresponding legal apparatus are necessary 
to make the rational expectations equilibrium in Variant 1 sustainable. Moreover, 
whenever an unexpected change of the endowment’s process makes the above-mentioned 
legal apparatus obsolete without prompting  its adjustment in due time, a switch to the 
Autarky model may occur for certain partitions of money across agents. With Variant 2 
by contrast, this is never the case. Secondly, financial innovation under Variant 1 may 
occur only when the distribution of money across agents is not too unequal while under 
Variant 2, the two agents always support financial innovation. Moreover, transitions from 
Variant 1 to Variant 2 and the reverse can happen only for one precise partition of money 
across agents to which convergence is in practice very rare. Furthermore, the best answer 
of authorities to systemic risk occurring in Variant 1 is not necessarily the adaptation of 
the legal apparatus that would make Variant 1 fully sustainable. On the contrary, it may 
be more astute for authorities who wish to foster financial innovation and overall welfare 
to promote a shift to Variant 2 in view of facilitating a subsequent shift to the Arrow-6
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Debreu model. Finally, if the original partition of money is too unequal when a single 
currency is proposed to two closed economies, the introduction of a such currency 
through cash in advance constraints does not provide a uniform improvement to 
economic agents in autarky. 
Moreover, even absent any macroeconomic shock, the price and money partition 
dynamics that the two variants generate, exhibit jumps as well as fat-tails and vary 
depending on the discount rate. Consequently, as hoped by Farmer and Geanakoplos 
(2008) in their paper on “The virtues and vices of equilibrium and the future of financial 
economics’”, it might be possible for such models, if complemented with further markets, 
agents and/or institutions to generate some of the dynamics that were initially pointed out 
by Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1987) or Schiller(1991). Such dynamics have often 
been associated to disequilibrium models advocated by so called “econo-physicists” such 
as Beinhocker (2006) and Bouchaud (2009).  
Finally while tackling the above issues, a number of remarks confirming or infirming the 
literature on monetary models can be made. For example, contrary to Feenstra(1986) and 
Guidotti (1991), introducing a cash-in-advance constraint 'à la Clower'  is not necessarily 
equivalent to including money in the utility function of agents. Also, the assumptions, 
made by other literature concerning the stability of wealth distributions do not apply in a 
models like ours. This explains why our results differ from others. 7
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INTRODUCTION
 
The model presented in this paper is very simple. It includes two infinitely-lived 
agents with rational expectations living in a pure endowment economy, i.e. in an 
economy with neither production nor investment processes. Each period, agents 
receive their individual endowment of one non-durable good and then trade it in a 
centralized market. Also, this economy has neither financial markets nor financial 
intermediaries nor even an active central bank. However, there is a fixed quantity of 
money in the economy which agents, due to cash constraints, use both to carry out 
transactions and to save. As the endowments of the two agents differ and are 
determined by a Markov process, the model is dynamic and stochastic.  
The model, the main characteristic of which is the interaction of heterogeneity with 
cash constraints, has two variants: in the first one, a cash-in-advance constraint “à la 
Clower” (1967) forces agents to own all the cash needed for settling upcoming 
purchases before the start of trading. In the second variant, a cash-at-the-end-of-the-
day constraint allows agents to settle their transactions only once overall trading has 
ended
1.   
However, despite or because of this extreme simplicity, the model exhibits  properties 
that allow it to illustrate in a novel way the links between financial innovation and/or 
regression and  systemic risk in the context of a monetary model. First, Variants 1 and 
2 can be compared not only to each other, but also to two other general equilibrium 
models with close resemblance. In the so-called Autarky model, each of our two 
agents lives in “autarky’’ i.e. transact in a separate centralized market with agents of 
his/her kind instead of sharing a centralized good market with the other type of agents. 
The shift from one of the Variants to this Autarky constitutes a financial regression. 
In the so-called Arrow-Debreu model, by contrast, markets are complete and 
centralized; i.e. agents can trade their endowments before the start of transactions. 
Moving from one of the Variants to the Arrow-Debreu model certainly constitutes a 
financial innovation.
Secondly, let us define systemic risk as the risk that an economy in equilibrium 
suddenly reaches a collectively less efficient equilibrium as a result of an endogenous 
                                                 
1 Except for the possibility to interpret these variants as turnpike models, the model does not explain 
further how money arises in this economy and does not include mechanisms to explain the genesis of 
the corresponding legal and/or technical apparatus. 8
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phenomenon possibly complementing or responding to an exogenous one. This 
definition is close to the one of Aglietta and Moutot (1993) and/or the Committee on 
the Global Financial System (2010). A shift away from a Variant to Autarky as a 
result of the decision of one agent following an exogenous shock therefore qualifies as 
a systemic event, although the model does not have banks or financial markets.  Third, 
numerical solutions exist for both Variants. As shown in Moutot (1991), they can be 
found in almost all cases for Variant 1. Also, although the model is highly non-linear, 
the existence of solutions can be formally proven in specific cases. Variant 2, the 
cash-at–the–end-of the-day model, also has proven solutions in specific cases but in 
others does not have any. Moreover iterations do not converge when started in an 
inappropriate neighborhood. Nevertheless, for realistic values of the discount rate of 
utility, it is possible to numerically find and simulate equilibriums for Variant 2. As a 
consequence, numerical simulations allow calculating price and wealth distribution 
dynamics as well as agents’ welfares
2. Consequently, these properties allow 
considering how financial innovation and/or regression may or may not arise in the 
context of a neo-classical model with rational expectations and, in particular, how the 
risk of a systemic event may arise and be countered.  
This is the main contribution of this paper. Indeed, as agents are fully rational, they 
can in principle make the same calculations as the author and the reader of this article. 
So agents may, depending on the state and the amount of money they own and barring 
further incentives of legal nature, be tempted to shift from one variant or model to 
another. For instance, agents may individually or collectively support the 
development of financial innovation as in the Arrow-Debreu model. Alternatively, 
they may prefer a shift to autarky, which barring obviating incentives, could occur if 
decided by one type of agents.
3   
 
As a consequence, the following results can be reported. First, sufficient incentives 
and the corresponding legal apparatus are necessary to make the rational 
                                                 
2 In the example chosen, agents share a common logarithmic utility function and face an endowment 
process with micro- but no macro-economic uncertainty. 
3 It should be recognized however that agents are assumed to care only for their own consumption and 
do not share collective ideals They also assume that political or technical considerations and costs are 
not taken into account either. Neither are the computational difficulties that may be encountered in 
reaching a particular equilibrium considered. For instance, it may be argued that the costs associated to 
the identification of a fixed point solution to Variant 2 should be contrasted with those of Variant 1 and 
those of the Autarky and the Arrow-Debreu model which are negligible. 
5 For readers interested in this issue, Box 1 presents my views on this topic. 9
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expectations equilibrium in Variant 1 sustainable. In Variant 1 moreover, whenever 
an unexpected change of the endowment’s Markov process makes the above-
mentioned legal apparatus obsolete without prompting  its adjustment in due time, a 
switch to the Autarky model may occur for certain partitions of money across agents. 
With Variant 2 by contrast, this is never the case.  
Secondly, the partition of money among agents in the economy is an essential element 
when making Pareto comparisons of the equilibriums generated by our models. In 
particular, financial innovation under Variant 1 may occur only when the distribution 
of money across agents is not too unequal while under Variant 2, the two agents 
always support financial innovation. Moreover, transitions from Variant 1 to Variant 
2and the reverse  can happen only for one precise partition of money across agents to 
which convergence is in practice very rare. Furthermore,  the best answer of 
authorities to systemic risk occurring in Variant 1 is not necessarily the adaptation of 
the legal apparatus that would make Variant 1 fully sustainable. On the contrary, it 
may be more astute for authorities who wish to foster financial innovation and overall 
welfare to promote a shift to Variant 2 in view of facilitating a subsequent shift to the 
Arrow-Debreu model. Consequently, the framework used for the assessment of 
systemic risk in this suite of simple models is useful in assessing trade-offs between 
the prevention of systemic risks and financial development.  
Finally, if the original partition of money is too unequal when a single currency is 
proposed to two closed economies, the introduction of a such currency through cash 
in advance constraints does not provide a uniform improvement to economic agents in 
autarky, which is an important qualification of the Townsend (1980) and Kiyotaki and 
Wright (1989) results. Again, this is not the case with cash-at-the-end-of-the-day 
constraints. 
The following should be recognized however. While allowing to generate systemic 
events in connection with the partition of money/wealth and while providing an 
estimate of its long term cost for each agent, this framework does not allow a 
description of all aspects of such systemic event. For instance, it does not tell us how 
long this event would last nor the behavior of prices and consumption during this 
interim period. This is because it does not make hypotheses concerning the 
functioning of the economy while moving from one type of equilibrium to another, i.e 
it does not model disequilibrium. This is also at odds with the more concrete 
approaches of systemic risk followed by authors like Acharya (2009) when 10
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developing a theory of systemic risk.
 
Nevertheless –and it is a second but less important contribution of this paper-  the two 
variants of this general equilibrium model are able to generate diverse dynamics of 
money/wealth partition across agents and of prices. These dynamics exhibits jumps 
and fat-tails, depending on the level of the discount rate of utility. Consequently, as 
hoped by Farmer and Geanakoplos (2008) in their paper on “The virtues and vices of 
equilibrium and the future of financial economics”, it might be possible for such 
models, if complemented with further markets, agents and/or institutions to generate 
some of the dynamics that were initially pointed out by Cutler, Poterba and Summers 
(1987) or Schiller (1991). Such dynamics have often been associated to disequilibrium 
models advocated by so called “econo-physicists” such as Beinhocker (2006) and 
Bouchaud (2009).  
 
Proving or illustrating these various points however assumes first that one accepts the 
use of cash constraints in a model as legitimate although a number of economists have 
questioned such practice
5. Moreover, it necessitates a good understanding of the way 
both Variants operate and, in particular, of the dynamics of money partition across 
agents as well as of the dynamics of prices under the two Variants. Somehow, those 
dynamics of money/wealth partition condition not only the shifts to Autarky but also 
the practicability of collective decisions in favor of financial development. 
Furthermore, describing and explaining these dynamics is also an occasion to confirm 
or infirm a set of points and/or assumptions previously made in the literature on 
money demand and/or on cash-in advance models as well as former literature on 
models with heterogeneous agents and the ability of general equilibrium models to 
generate price dynamics with realistic features. 
For example, according to Feenstra (1986) and Guidotti (1991), introducing a cash-in-
advance constraint 'à la Clower' in a model would be equivalent to including money in 
the utility function of agents. We show however that whenever agents are sufficiently 
heterogeneous and for realistic values of the discount factor of utility of agents, cash 
constraints cannot remain continuously binding, making this equivalence uncertain. 
Hence money may be held even when cash constraints are not binding and may 
therefore play a role of asset or insurance on top of its role in transactions.  
This point is particularly important for macro-modeling as most micro-economically 11
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founded macro-models either introduce money within the utility function of economic 
agents or combine the use of a cash-in-advance constraint with the assumption of a 
representative agent, thereby making the cash-in-advance constraint continuously 
binding and implying a constant money velocity. Even when introducing state-of-the 
art investment functions, and although constraints may occasionally be non-binding, 
this makes velocity insufficiently flexible as demonstrated in Hodrick, Kocherlakota, 
and Lucas (1991) in the case of a representative agent’s model. Therefore some (e.g. 
Woodford 2006) reject this inclusion and argue that money plays no active role in the 
determination of the economic dynamics.  By contrast, the most frequently used 
DSGE models with an active role for money (for instance Christiano, Motto and 
Rostagno 2007) not only include money in the utility function of consumers but 
complement it with the inclusion of banks and investors for which continuously 
binding collateral constraints are imposed.  In the case of Variant 1 however, the 
absence of complete financial markets and the frictions generated by the cash-in-
advance constraint make money a natural saving and insurance instrument and makes 
money velocity very flexible.  
This is in line with views already put forward by Bewley (1980) and Lucas (1980) and 
the subsequent literature with heterogeneous agents. Indeed, our approach rather 
supports similar views by Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1990) and Fuerst (1991), 
although the latter also mentions a preference to avoid such role for money. By 
contrast, other more recent approaches by Algan and Ragot (2010) and by Wen 
(2010) also give a role of insurance to money. Also, the importance of timing 
conventions apparent in the contrasts we present between Variant 1 and 2 was pointed 
out by many of the authors above, starting with Lucas (1980). For instance, we find a 
shift from Variant 1 to Variant 2 clearly diminishes the short term variability of prices 
while increasing their average level and thereby decreasing velocity. 
 
However, why do all those papers not mention results similar to ours in terms of price 
dynamics or systemic risk? This is because our modeling strategy differs from these 
various approaches in several respects. First, we consider two distinct agents instead 
of using the methodology originally suggested by Lucas(1980) which lumps into one 
family the various agents but as a consequence cannot consider the impact of wealth 
on agents’ behavior. Moreover, we do not introduce money in the utility function like 
Algan and Ragot as counterparty to also assuming continuously binding cash 12
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1352
June 2011
constraints. Also, and although we introduce cash-in advance constraints and 
heterogeneity like Wen (2010), we do not have a bond market and a monetary policy. 
Moreover, contrary to all this literature on heterogeneous agents including Wen 
(2010), we do not assume that the distribution of money or wealth has to converge to 
a constant after some finite time. This assumption, which is made by many authors 
like Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) or Burkhard and Mauȕner in their 2005 book on 
general equilibrium models is understandable with an infinity of agents and the 
possibility for monetary policy or other macro-economic policies to intervene in order 
to influence or stabilize such money/wealth distribution. This assumption, which is 
natural and fair with one representative agent as argued by Lucas (1980) and proven 
for fairly general statistical settings by Micio (2004), is a much less justified starting 
point in the context of financial development or systemic risk which by nature cannot 
be consistent with a stationary or even a constant distribution of money or wealth.  
As a consequence, our two variants generate a high variability of the partition of 
money/wealth and of prices in cases where other models would not assume and/or 
generate any. In particular, microeconomic shocks invisible at a macroeconomic level 
may well create sizable variations of prices and money/wealth distribution. Moreover, 
they generate various jumps and fat-tail effects that are otherwise difficult to generate.  
 
In the following, Section 2 presents the model and its two variants, shows how to 
identify the functional operator of which the fixed point determines completely the 
solution. Section 3 assesses whether and when cash constraints are binding or not. 
Section 4 describes the dynamics of the model by concentrating on a specific example 
and shows that they are quite diverse. Section 5 examines the link between cash 
constraints and welfare in the context of the example identified in Section 4. In 
particular, Section 5 shows the need for a legal framework to make the rational 
expectations equilibrium sustainable, and illustrates the existence of systemic risk, 
and financial development in the context of the very simplified suite of models 
described above. Section 6 concludes. 13
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A MODEL WITH TWO AGENTS UNDER CASH CONSTRAINTS, 
ONE GOOD, ONE CURRENCY AND NO BOND MARKET 
 
In this section, I describe the two variants of the model, define its equilibrium, outline 
the corresponding first order conditions and transform them into a functional operator. 
I also discuss the solutions of this operator and the numerical techniques used to 
simulate the model. 
Description of the model
The model is in its first version a generalization of two well known models. Although 
it is similar to the one-agent monetary model with cash in advance constraint 
developed by Lucas and Stokey (1987) or Coleman (1986), it has two agents and can 
be interpreted as a turnpike model along the lines first developed by Townsend 
(1980). However, instead of being a perfect foresight model like Townsend's and 
Manuelli and Sargent's (1988), it incorporates uncertainty using a stochastic 
framework borrowed from Lucas and Stokey (1987). When it was formulated in my 
own thesis work (Moutot 1991), it was also a forerunner of models like Hansen and 
Imrohoroglu (1992) which include heterogeneous agents and cash constraints. 
However, as explained in its summary offered by Burkhard and Mauȕner (2004), 
most of this heterogeneous agents’ literature makes the assumption that the 
distribution of money across agents is constant or at least continuous over some range 
as soon as the economy has converged toward a stationary equilibrium. While this 
assumption is natural in the representative agent case or if some policy enforces it, it 
is more tentative with heterogeneous agents as explained already by Lucas (1980). 
However, it allows identifying equilibriums and calculating them numerically without 
first solving for a fixed point of a functional operator, as shown below. This is not 
assumed here. 
 
The model is formulated in discrete time with an infinite horizon. There are two 
agents, respectively named a and b  and not an infinity as in Hansen and Imrohoroglu 
(1992). At the beginning of each period, t, each of these two agents receives an 14
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endowment of a unique non-storable good. These endowments called respectively 
a
t ξ  
and 
b
t ξ  are outcomes of a stochastic process (to be defined later) such that 
a
t ξ  and 
b
t ξ  
are bounded away from zero. The sum of 
a
t ξ  and 
b
t ξ , which is the economy total 
endowment of goods for period t is called  t ξ . 
There is no private or asymmetric information. At the beginning of each period each 
consumer observes his own endowment as well as the other consumer's endowment. 
Hence the information set  t I of the two consumers is identical and contains data on 
past and present endowments and prices. Each agent has preferences over his/her 
infinite lifetime consumption sequence 
∞
=0 } { t
i
t c  as described by its time-separable 
utility function, 
() } , { ] [
0









where  1 0 ≤ < β  is identical for agent a and b, but where  a U (.) and  b U (.) can differ. 
Both  a U (.) and  b U (.) are assumed to be continuously differentiable, strictly 
increasing and strictly concave. 
The only asset in this economy is money. The total amount of money in the economy 
is fixed to 1 and, at any given time t, this amount is divided between the two agents. 
Agent a possesses 
a
t m  units and agent b possesses 
b




t m = 1 
 
From one period to the next, changes in the money holdings of the two agents are 
described by their budget constraints. 








t ∈ − + = + ξ  
 
Indeed, after receiving their endowments, the two agents go to a market. In the first 
variant of the model, they sell their entire endowment and buy the amounts of the 
good (respectively, 
a
t c and 
b
t c ) that they want to consume during period t 
independently and at a competitively determined price p t. Both need to own enough 
cash at the beginning of the day to finance their consumption independently of the 
prospective receipts of their endowment’s sale. Therefore the possession of money at 15
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the beginning of period t is essential in this variant, for  both consumers are 
confronted by a Clower-type (1967) cash in advance constraint: This is representative 
of an atomised market with no clearing authority, no possibility to divide and 
sequence purchase and sale orders, where trust is limited and legal guarantees on the 
payment of intra-day debts non-existent.   




t t ∈ ≤  
   
In the second variant of the model, they can simultaneously sell their endowment 
and buy at a competitively determined price p t their consumption during period t and 
can use the proceeds of their sale to guarantee their purchases. The possession of 
money is therefore constraining only at the end of period t trading when they need to 
settle all their transactions, which implies   
} , { 0 1 b a i m
i
t ∈ ≥ +  
or equivalently 






t t ∈ + ≤ ξ  
 This, by contrast, implies that a clearing system and the legal and computational 
framework necessary to ensure its good functioning are available, although the 
reasons for its creation and the costs it generates are not accounted for by the model. 
The equations corresponding to this variant will be numbered with a ‘ sign whenever 
different from those of the first variant. 
. 
 










t c c ξ ξ ξ = + = +  
 
Uncertainty is introduced through the definition of endowments. These endowments 
are time invariant functions of shocks generated by a first-order Markov process with 
a stationary transition function of density  (.,.) π  such that 16
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} , { ) ( b a i st
i i
t ∈ =ξ ξ   and    
) ' , ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 ds s s s B s P s s B s P
B
t t t t π μ μ ³ = = ∈ = = ∈ + + + +  
whenever B belongs to the family of Borel Sets of S. 
 
Definition of an equilibrium








t m m c c and 








t m m c c t 1 1, , , , + +  and  t p  be the solutions of the two 
following maximization problems supplemented by two general equilibrium 
conditions: 
Problem of Agent   } , { b a i i ∈  






l I c U E Max +
∞ =





t m c 1 , +  
subject to: 




u t u t t ∈ = − − − ξ ξ  




t t ∈ ≤        (1.1) 






t t ∈ + ≤ ξ         (1.1’) 








t ∈ − + = + ξ      (1.2) 









t m m + = 1         ( 1 . 4 )  
 
Equilibria studied here are such that processes generated are time-homogeneous 17
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functions of shocks  } { t s  and of  } {
a
t m and do not depend on sunspot variables
6.  
First order conditions 
If we call 
i
t γ  and 
i
t θ  the four Lagrange multipliers corresponding to (1.1) or (1.1’) 
and (1.2), we have the following first order conditions: 
 






t i ∈ = + − θ γ    (1.5) 






t ∈ = + − + + γ θ β θ    (1.6) 











     and      0 (.)
' ' ≤ i U } , {   b a i∈                         (1.5’) and (1.6’) 
 
Transforming the set of first-order conditions
into a functional operator.
a) The determination of the current price  t p  
If our model possesses an equilibrium, then  t p  can be shown to be a function h(.) of 
t m , the current partition of money between agents , of 
a
t θ  and 
b
t θ , the Lagrange 
multipliers for the two budget constraints, and of  t
•
ξ , the vector of goods 
endowments. 
To see this, let us first write (1.1) and (1.1’) as respectively: 
 




t ∈ ≤   with equality when  0 >
i
t γ  
                                                 
6 For further explanation, see Moutot(1991). 
8 For more detail, see again Moutot (1991). 18
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t ∈ + ≤ ξ  with equality when  0 >
i
t γ  
Since (.) i U  is strictly increasing and strictly concave, its derivative  (.) 'i U has an 
inverse  (.) '
1 −
i U . It follows from (1.5) that: 
} , { )) ( ( '






t ∈ + =
− γ θ  
Like (.) 'i U , 
1 '
−
i U  is strictly decreasing. Also, the Lagrange multiplier 
i
t γ  can only 
be positive or equal to zero. 
Therefore,  
 } , { ) ( '





− θ with equality when  0 =
i
t γ   
Consequently, 
} , { )] ( ' , [







− θ     (1.7) 
} , { )] ( ' , [








t ∈ + =
− θ ξ    (1.7’) 
 
Finally, substituting (1.7) or respectively (1.7’) for  a i =  and  b i =  into (1.3), writing 
a
t m as  t m  and using (1.4) to replace 
t
b m  by  t m − 1 ,  and taking into account that in the 
second variant both cash constraints cannot be simultaneously binding, we get: 
)} ( ' ) ( ' ), ( '
1
), ( ' ,
1
{























Min θ θ θ θ ξ
− − − − + +
−
+ =  
(1.8) 
)} ( ' ) ( ' ), ( '
1
), ( ' {

























Min θ θ θ ξ θ ξ ξ




t ξ  is therefore equal to the minimum of four different functions of t p  in the first 
variant and only three in the case of the second variant, each of them decreasing and 
invertible. Therefore there exists for both variants, a function h such that: 
) , , (
• •
= ξ θ t t t m h p      (1.9) 
where  t
•




t ξ ξ  and   t
•




t θ θ . 
The nature of this function  (.) h  is best understood by inverting each of the four or 19
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three functions of  t p  on the right-hand side of (1.8) or (1.8’) independently and 
writing  (.) h ,  as the minimum of these four,  respectively 3, inverted functions. 








t t t t t t h m h m h h Min m h ξ θ θ ξ θ ξ θ ξ ξ θ =
• •
   (1.10) 












t t t t t h m h m h Min m h ξ θ θ ξ θ ξ θ ξ θ =
• •
    (1.10’) 
This shows that the price  t p  shifts between 4, respectively 3, different regimes of 
determination, depending on which agent is or is not cash-constrained.  ) ( 1 t h ξ  is the 
price which prevails when both consumers are under a binding cash constraint in the 










t m h ξ θ , 
defines  t p when consumer a's cash constraint is binding whereas consumer b's cash 
constraint is not.  ) , , ( 3 t
a




t t m h ξ θ , determines  t p when agent 
b is under a binding cash constraint while agent a is not. Finally,  t m does not enter the 




t h ξ θ θ because  (.) 4 h defines the price  t p  in the case where neither a 
nor b are bound by cash constraints. 
 
b) The partition  1 + t m  of the money supply 
Using (1.7), respectively (1.7’) and (1.2), one can write:  
} , { ))} ( ' ( , { )} ( ' , {
1 1
1 b a i p U p m p Max p U
P
m
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− −
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(1.11) 
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1 1
1 b a i p U p m Max p U
P
m



















t ∈ − + = + − + =
− −
+ θ ξ θ ξ ξ
          ( 1 . 1 1 ’ )  
Substituting (1.9) into (1.11), respectively (1.11’) shows that  1 + t m  is determined by 
the same variables as  t p and can consequently be written: 
) , , ( 1 t t t t m M m
• •
+ = ξ θ      ( 1 . 1 2 )  






t ξ  and 
b
t ξ . To 
characterize the equilibrium law of motion   1 + t m  and hence  1 + t p , we must solve for 
the Lagrange multipliers 
a
t θ  and 
b
t θ . 20
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Constructing the functional operator 
We now make use of equations (1.6) and (1.11) for  a i =  and  b i = . Since both 
equations link variables at time t to expectations of variables at  1 + t , they will 
become the core of a functional operator which is outlined the assumption of 
"stationary expectations"
8:  
For this, we will simultaneously take into account the set of all possible draws of the 
stochastic process  } { t s and of all possible partitions of money, therefore replacing  t s  
and  t m  by two generic variables respectively called sandm . Then, 
 if  s s s u t t = = +  and  m m m u t t = = +  , 




t θ θ θ = = +  for  0 ≥ t ,  0 ≥ u , and  } , { b a i∈  




















and assume  ) , ( m s θ belongs to 
2 C  x 
2 C where 
2 C  is the set of continuous and 
bounded functions on S x [0,1]. 
From (1.5) and (1.7), respectively (1.7’):  
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It follows from (1.6) and (1.12) that: 
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with: )) ( ), , ( , ( ' s m s m M m
• •
= ξ θ    and:  ´)) ( ´), ´, ( ´, (
' s m s m h h
• •
= ξ θ  
Stationary equilibria can therefore be considered as the fixed points of a multi-
dimensional functional operators Φdefined by (1.13). The knowledge of this fixed 
point combined to the knowledge of the stochastic process {s t} and of the initial 
partition of money m 0 determines all the other variables. Please note that at no time 
was the assumption of a constant distribution of money across agents made. 
 
c) Existence and numerical calculation of solutions 
Finally, do functional operators like Φ have solutions and can we calculate them?  
The answer to the first part of this question is still incomplete. Indeed, the Schauder 
Theorem which is the standard tool used by mathematicians to prove the existence of 
fixed points cannot be directly applied here given hat  Φ is not a compact operator. 
However, as shown in Moutot (1991), it is possible to prove in a number of Variant 1 
cases that its solutions are also solutions of more convoluted but nevertheless compact 
operators derived from  Φ  and to which the Schauder Theorem can be applied. 
Hence, solutions to (1.13) can be proved to exist in specific cases, including when 
endowments are constant and when ȕ is small enough. However, such convoluted 
operators have not yet been derived for the most general cases, implying that full 
certainty about the existence of solutions to (1.13) cannot be reached yet. 
However, solutions can in most Variant 1 and Variant 2 cases be approximated by 
numerical techniques. Let us represent the range [0,1] over which m may vary by a 
grid with a finite number of points (usually 256 in the forthcoming sections) and the 
functions ) , ( m s θ  as matrices of dimension (2,S,256) where S is the finite number of 
possible shocks. As also shown by Moutot (1991), it is possible to search for solutions 
by iterations of Φ  occasionally combined with interpolations when it is not  22
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possible due to computing constraints to use a fine enough grid
10. It is then shown that 
solutions can be found across a number of choices for ß, for  a U (.) and  b U (.), and for 
Markov processes such as  } , { ) ( b a i st
i ∈ ξ .  This answers positively the second 
part of the question above and motivates the next sections. 
                                                 
10 As  ) , ( m s θ  is a multidimensional function approximated by a matrix, such interpolations are based 
on a generalization of the traditional Newton technique to an infinite dimensional context. Suppose that 
) , ( 1 m s θ  and  ) , ( 2 m s θ  are two functions between which the iterations of the functional operator 
end up alternating. Be ) , ( 3 m s θ  such that: 
  ) , ( m s a θ = a  ) , ( 1 m s θ  + (1-a)  ) , ( 2 m s θ  0<_a_<1 
and  ) , ( 3 m s θ = 
a
Argmin  ( ) , ( m s a θ -Φ ( ) , ( m s a θ ))∗( ) , ( 1 m s θ - ) , ( 2 m s θ ) 
where  ∗ is the scalar product of in the space of finite dimension matrices used to approximate the 
functions to which applies.  ) , ( 3 m s θ  and  ) , ( 4 m s θ =  Φ ( ) , ( m s a θ ))can be determined by 
successive approximations. In a one dimensional case, this method is identical to the Newton 
interpolation method. In a multidimensional case however, this is only the first step of a sequential 
interpolation process, the same interpolation technique being applied to  ) , ( 3 m s θ  and  ) , ( 4 m s θ  in a 
second step. After enough iterations, this interpolation technique has in most cases led us to a point 
where  ) , ( m s n θ  and  ) , ( 1 m s n+ θ  were close enough to be considered as good approximations of the 
fixed point.  
 
13 The relative level of the general welfare created by Variants 1 and 2 was checked in order to 
ascertain that differences between them did not result from the randomness associated to the Monte 
Carlo method. The relative levels were found to be estimated in a robust way. 23
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One of the original reasons for developing the first Variant of the model presented in 
this paper is to answer the above question. Following Feenstra (1986) or Guidotti 
(1991), a cash-in-advance constraint is equivalent to the inclusion of money into the 
utility function. Indeed, if it is continuously binding, it is equivalent to maximize the 
utility function under such constraint or to add to the utility function a separable part 
including money. At the same time, continuously binding cash-in-advance constraints 
imply that the velocity of money in the economy remains constant over time, which is 
not realistic and explains the rejection of cash-in-advance constraints by many 
economists.  
It is therefore important to understand whether and when cash-in-advance constraints 
are continuously binding. In this section, I will show, as demonstrated by Moutot 
(1991), that whenever the discount rate of utility is higher than a certain threshold, 
value, the two cash constraints of Variant 1 cannot be simultaneously and 
continuously binding. In Variant 2, both cash constraints cannot be simultaneously 
binding by construction. However, I will also show that, at least for a specific set of 
stochastic environments and when utility functions are logarithmic, solutions with one 
of the cash constraints always binding exist forβ  within a certain range. This will 
allow determining for which parameters the specific models used in Sections 4 and 5 
have continuously binding cash constraints. 
 
Theorem 1 
Be Ua(.) and Ub(.) two continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and 
strictly concave utility functions. Assume that the model considered is specified as a 
Variant 1 model and thatβ  is strictly superior to 0. If there exists a “stationary 
expectations" equilibrium and if, in this context, after a finite number of periods both 
agents are always under cash constraint, then: 24
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β β    (2.1) 
Proof: see in Annex 1 copied from the full theorem proved by Moutot (1991) showing 
existence of solutions in such case. 
 
It is easy to illustrate this formula in the case where both utility functions are 

























⊂ = ≤                                         (2.2) 
Hence, in Variant 1 and for logarithmic utility, the equivalence between money in the 
utility function and cash-in-advance constraints is only valid if the ratio of individual 
shares of the total endowment does not vary too strongly across time. If one assumes 
as found by most studies that the discount rate of utility is around 0.95 for quarterly 
models of the economy, this implies that the ratio of such shares across time should 
remain higher that 0.95. Equivalently, this share should never vary more than 5.2% 
across time. Obviously, this implies that the above mentioned equivalence is probably 
not valid continuously and likely not in financial crises where the partition of 
endowments may strongly vary. 
  
In the context of Variant 2, cash constraints can by definition never be binding 
simultaneously as evidenced by the fact that  ) ( 1 t h ξ does not intervene in (1.10’). 












t t t t t h m h m h Min m h ξ θ θ ξ θ ξ θ ξ θ =
• •
    (1.10’) 
 
However, under Variant 1, cash constraints are binding whenever m is low or high 
enough whatever the state, because without money, consumption is impossible. Is 
there by analogy a level of money partition under Variant 2 under which each agent 
gets systematically constrained? The answer is no. Under Variant 2, one is not 
necessarily cash-constrained whenever he/she owns no money.  
  25
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Theorem 2  
Suppose that  log(.) (.) =
i U for all } , { b a i ⊂ Any solution to (1.13’) for which prices 
are well defined is such that: 
-at least for one s in S, prices are determined by  4 h  or  3 h   for m=0. 
-at least for one s in S, prices are determined by  4 h  or  2 h  for m=1.
. 
Proof:  See Annex 1.The intuition behind this result is the following: there must be a 
state where the endowment of agent a is higher than his/her usual or average 
consumption. Therefore, he/she will consume less than his/her endowment even if 
he/she has no money, and thereby will be in a position to acquire some money to be 
used in the next period. Consequently, m=0 is not necessarily a sign of cash constraint 
and, by definition of   4 h  and  3 h  , this implies that one of them must determine prices 
in this case. 
Finally, under Variant 2, it is interesting to check for which parameters there is at each 
point in time one cash-constrained agent.  This determines “a contrario” for which 
values of β  none of the agents is ever cash-constrained. Although this domain can be 
generally determined, (see Proposition A.3 in Annex 1), it does not take the shape of a 
simple and general formula like (2.1) or even (2.2 ). valid under most circumstances. 
This is why I chose to calculate and present it for the specific type of Markov process 
and type of endowment variability for which a simple formula is available. Theorem 3 
below also offers an actual proof of existence of solutions to (1.13) for cases where 
there always is one agent at a time under cash constraint.  
 
Theorem 3  
Suppose that  log(.) (.) =
i U for all } , { b a i ⊂ . Suppose also that  ) ' , ( s s π  is a two-state 










. Suppose finally that the endowment matrix 
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and is such that cash constraints are always binding for one of the two agents.  
Proof : See Annex 1.  
 
 
Overall, limiting ourselves to the specific case of logarithmic utility, of two states 







 =  z, it is 
possible to summarize in Chart 1 below the findings on the binding character of cash 
constraints  in Variant 1 and 2 solutions to (1.13) for alternative values of β  and z.  





































Variant 2 Lower Bound





Variant 1 non binding
Variant 1 non binding,
Variant 2 binding for 
one agent
 
Chart  1 
In the area below the diagonal, Variant 1 has solutions with binding cash constraints 
and defined prices. Indeed, (2.2) can now be written as: z Max = ≤
1 β β . By contrast, 
Variant 2 has no solution with determined prices. This does not mean that non-
monetary equilibriums do not exist. They do but do not give a well defined value to 
goods and hence to money. Of course, the assumptions made by Feenstra (1986) and 
Guidotti (1989) cannot be relevant in such a case. 
Above the diagonal, Variant 1 has solutions but they all include occasions when none 
of the cash constraints are binding. By contrast, above the diagonal, Variant 2 
solutions with well defined prices exist only above the black curve.  Up to the red 
curve, they always have one agent under cash constraint while the other is not 27
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constrained. Beyond, the red curve, they also include occasional episodes where none 
of the agents is cash constrained.  
For instance, assuming β =0.95 again, z has to be lower than  β β − 2 /  or 0.90 and 
higher than 0.76 in order to allow for the existence of a monetary equilibrium with 















































.Hence, its share of the total endowment may vary up to 
31% from one state to another and still be consistent with the existence of one binding 
cash constraint but should vary more than 10% in order to be consistent with the 
existence of a monetary equilibrium. While some large variations are possible but 
limited ones impossible, such an environment is again not realistic and comes in 
contrast with the views of Feenstra(1986) and Guidotti(1991). 
 
Hence, for realistic values of the discount factor and for logarithmic utility functions, 
the equivalence between cash-in-advance models and models with money-in-the-
utility function becomes uncertain because, contrary to assumptions made by Feenstra 
(1986) and Guidotti (1989), cash constraints cannot remain continuously binding 
when the discount rate of utility is too high relative to economic uncertainty. Of 
course, this result is partly the consequence of an absence of banks or of a bond 
market in the models. However, even if the latter existed, they would not allow the 
two agents to invest all their excess cash in bonds all the time or to see their purchases 
fully financed unless the model would include an assumption of perfect foresight or 
would open and close the banks before and after each trading session. Hence, the cash 
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Section 4 
THE DYNAMICS OF PRICES AND MONEY PARTITION 
UNDER VARIANTS 1 AND 2  
 
 
How are the dynamics of prices and money partition affected by the heterogeneity of 
agents and the existence of non-continuously binding cash constraints? In order to 
illustrate their impact, I devise a simple experiment that allows for a comparison of 
the two variants of our model, one with the other as well as with other models. This 
lets  us    differentiate the impact of the limited financial constraint as reflected by 
Variant 2 from the impact of stronger financial frictions coming from cash-in-advance 
constraints, i.e in Variant 1. In this endeavor, I will first describe price variability in a 
general manner. Then I will examine the dynamics of money partition and explain 
how it is related to the dynamics of prices.  I will then discuss the dynamics of money 
partition and in turn of prices. This will help show that such dynamics are much richer 
than in models with one representative agent and share some, but not all of the 
characteristics of price dynamics observed in reality. Some of these elements will be 




Let us simulate the following case: 
-both agents have a logarithmic utility function, 
-both discount rates of utility are equal to 0.9, 







50 . 0 50 . 0
50 . 0 50 . 0
, 












 with xs=2. 
Then the total goods endowment in the economy is constant over time and fixed at 
10 units per period. However, agents' individual endowments vary: as xs=2, each 
agent has one chance out of two to receive 3 units of good while the other receives 7 29
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1352
June 2011
and one chance out of two to receive 7 units while the other receives 3 only. Hence ß 
is superior to
1


























β β   , 
and long term solutions cannot have constantly binding cash constraints in Variant 
1. 
Moreover, such value of β  is also in the range of values for which equilibriums with 
well defined prices in Variant 2 have to include situations where none of the agents is 
cash constrained as shown by Theorem 3:  
) 1 ( 2







= β .=0.835782< 0.9 
After having identified the value of the fixed points of  
) , )( ( ) , ( m s m s θ θ Φ =         ( 1 . 1 3 )  
we use it to calculate the values of  )) ( ), , ( , ( s m s m M
• •
ξ θ   and:  )) ( ), , ( , ( s m s m h
• •
ξ θ  for all 
possible couples (s,m) in S X [0,1]. Then we calculate time series by giving an initial 
value to m and iterating up to 1000 and occasionally 2000 periods. 
= +1 t m )) ( ), , ( , ( t t t s m s m M
• •
ξ θ ) , ( t t s m F =       (4.1) 
 
 
Money velocity in Variants 1 and 2 in relation to usual models   
 
If the total goods endowment of an economy and its total money supply are constant, 
traditional macro-economically defined money demand equations can only generate 
constant prices and constant money velocity. Similarly, in the case of a one 
representative agent model such as the one developed in Lucas and Stokey (1987) the 
steadiness of the total goods endowment and the absence of any monetary surprise 
also imply constant consumption, always-binding cash constraints for the 
representative agent, as well as constant prices and money velocity. However, such is 
not the case in our two variants if the partition of the total endowment between agents 30
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is not constant over time and if cash constraints are not always binding (see Figures 1 




















































Indeed, the money partition, the price and therefore money velocity are highly 
variable in both Variants as evidenced in Figures 1 and 2. However, the level of 
prices is very different in the two variants. As apparent in Table 1, it is 4.7 times 
higher in Variant 2 which is logical as the price is connected to the utility of net 
transactions rather than to their bulk. Also, the average deviation, the standard 
deviation and, more importantly the variance of prices is much lower in Variant 1. 31
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Finally, prices are more (and negatively) auto-correlated at the first lag in Variant 1. 
This negative correlation is logical but also shows the limitations of a model that, 
despite heterogeneity and financial frictions, cannot adequately mimic a widely-
discussed feature of asset markets (see Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989) or 
Schiller (1991)), their positive autocorrelation in the short term.. 
  
Table 1 
Prices Variant 1  Variant 2  Ratio 
Average 0.085653397  0.403005117  4.705069 
Average deviation  0.005251789  0.030751014  5.85534 
Standard
deviation 0.006110022  0.033598821  5.498969 
Variance 3.73E-05  1.13E-03  30.23866 
Autocorrelation      
lag 1  -0.378095537  0.072960957   
lag 2  -0.070243947  -0.134459375   
lag 3  -0.090740589  -0.03038133   
 
Indeed, it includes neither investment nor loans and does not assume a positive 
correlation of its shocks. It therefore cannot offer its agents the possibility to 
envisage a continuation of recent trends in prices and therefore a positive short-term 
correlation. However, as we will see later, the model has some potential for 
exhibiting some other features of market data.   
 
Explaining the dynamics of money partition and of prices in Variants 1 and 2 
 
Indeed, the dynamics of money partition can be quite different across variants and 
evolve with the value of β  . This is easy to see on Graphs 1.1 and 1.2 where the 
money partition of period t+1 is shown as a function of the money partition at time t 
and of the state of the world s at time t. In Variant 1 the money partition always 
converges (see also Graph 3.1) into an interval formed by the intersection of the 
diagonal with the two curves describing the evolution of money partition from one 
period to the next depending on the state of the world. Afterwards, it remains within 
this interval, i.e. between  Min m and Max m , and may a priori reach any point of it 
depending on the succession of exogenous states t s . Somehow, money partition 32
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jumps according to the state inside a box delineated by the interval [ Min m , Max m ] and 
two almost parallel and increasing lines.  
This is quite different under Variant 2 (see Graph 1.2 as well as Graph 3.2). 
Whatever , β  the partition of money may always become so unequal that it 
concentrates into the hands of one agent and reach 0 or 1. Moreover, the distribution 
of money partition across time may show accumulation at 0 and 1: not only does it 
stay there when the state does not change (see Graph 1.2) but it is also attracted to 0 
or 1 whenever the money partition gets into the neighborhood of these extremes. 
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As evidenced by Graphs 1.1 and 1.2, the link between prices or velocity and the 
distribution of money across agents is two dimensional whereas its dimension is 
zero in usual macro models and money demand equations. Moreover, this link is 
non-linear and non-monotonous in Variant 1. By contrast, in Variant 2, it is 
continuously increasing or decreasing according to the state and not very far from 
linear. 
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Finally, let’s look at the case. 999 . 0 = β . Graphs 1.3 and 1.4 show that the corridors 
of determination of the money partition become, except for their ends, increasingly 
similar across the two variants. However, the range [ Min m , Max m ] which is larger, 
remains still in the interior of the segment [0, 1]. 
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Graph 1.4 
 
The dynamics of money partition across time in Variants 1 and 2 
Graph 3.1 and 3.2 show the distribution of money partition under Variants 1 and 2 
when simulated over 1000 periods starting with an equal money partition, i.e. 
5 . 0 0 = m  at time 0. In both cases, there is some accumulation at the edges of the 
respective intervals [ Min m , Max m ] and [0,1].  
Graph 3.1 remains similar but not identical for different runs of these 1000 periods. 
The probability of an equal money partition is always nil if one does not 
count 5 . 0 0 = m , implying that there is at least one point in the interval [ Min m , Max m ] 
and [0,1] which is unlikely to be revisited rapidly. This remark will have interesting 
consequences in the context of the next section. 
 Moreover, the occurrences of other values than  Min m  and  Max m  are usually lower 
than for the latter two values. However, the number of such occurrences may vary 
substantially across runs for high values of β , which explains that some runs were 
carried out for 2000 periods in order to check that distributions were stabilizing.  
This makes the behavior of Variant 1 quite different from the behavior of other 
models in the heterogeneous agents literature (see for instance Imrohoroglu (1992) 
or Burkhard and Mauȕner (2004) which explicitly assume invariant wealth 
distributions. Moreover, the shape taken by the distribution is not consistent with the 
characteristics of distributions generated by representative agent models as 
described by Medio (2004). More precisely, the function F in (4.1) should be 
topologically transitive, that is should not only map the respective intervals 
[ Min m , Max m ] and [0,1] into themselves but also revisit any point of it after a finite 
number of periods, which does not seem to be the case.  36
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Distribution of money partition over 1000 periods






















By contrast, Graph  3.2 remains quite stable across runs showing that money 
partition varies across a limited set of numbers across time in the example chosen 
and makes discrete jumps across more values, but not so many, than the number of 
microeconomic shocks. Hence, a rational expectations model with heterogeneous 
agents can, even without considering investment, create more discrete price and 
Distribution of money partition over 1000 periods
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money partition jumps than the number of macro-news. Moreover, it can exhibit 
more types of jumps than the number of micro-news which create its dynamics. 
Hence, disequilibrium approaches are not the only possible approaches to a 
phenomenon that seems to characterize a number of markets, as argued by a number 
of authors (see for instance Bouchaud (2009) for an interesting and visual summary 
of this literature).  
 
Distribution of money partition over 1000 periods





















Moreover, the nature of the distributions of money partitions generated may vary a 
lot depending onβ . For instance, when β  is low and makes cash-in-advance 
constraints always binding, the partition of money, although variable, always jumps 
after a few iterations between two values, thereby converging toward an invariant 
probability distribution, as standard for most general equilibrium models with one 
agent (Lucas (1980), Lucas and Stokey (1989), Medio (2004)). However, whenβ  
increases and becomes close to one, the distribution of the sequence of money 
partitions becomes more continuous and, under Variant 1, looks increasingly like a 
normal distribution (see Graph 3.1). But this is not the case under Variant 2 (see 
Graph 3.4). In that case, once chance has pushed money partition in one direction, it 
may take a very long time before the other extreme is reached. 
Overall, varying β  within the context of the general equilibrium models with 38
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rational expectations and heterogeneous agents constituted by Variants 1 and 2 
allows to create a wealth of dynamics for the partition of money/wealth. As 
indicated by Farmer and Geneakoplos (2008), some authors (for instance Bouchaud, 
(2009)) would see them as characteristic of disequilibrium models. 
 
Distribution of money partition over 1000 periods




















Distribution of money partition over 1000 periods
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The dynamics of prices across time in Variants 1 and 2 
 
The dynamics of prices is also quite different from the dynamics that could be 
generated by more traditional models. The assumption of normality of the price 
distribution is also here deprived of any justification. Moreover, some price jumps 
are common (Graph 4.1). 
 
 Distribution of prices over 1000 periods 



















As concerns Variant 2, the simulation underlying Graph 4.2 also confirms that 
jumps across prices accompany the jumps of the money partition.  
 Distribution of prices over 1000 periods 



















As already mentioned above, price jumps can be numerous and be difficult to relate 
to the number of news, be they macro- or micro-news. 40
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 Distribution of prices over 1000 periods 




















Looking at the case where 999 . 0 = β is again interesting as a distribution similar to a 
fat tail appears under Variant 1 (Graph 4’’). This shape is quite logical as the quasi 
normality of the money partition under Variant 1 is combined to the symmetrical 
and close design of the price determination under the two shocks (see Graphs .5 and 
5’).  
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Price shock 0 
Price shock 1
Graph 5.2 
This type of fat tail shape also appears when considering the distribution of price 
changes as under Graph 6 and Graph 6’.  
Distribution of price changes over 1000 periods 
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Finally, at such level of the discount rate of utility, it is logical to wonder whether 
the good traded is not quoted on an almost continuous basis. Hence, it might be 
interesting to check the shape of the cumulative probability distribution of price 
changes to check whether it has a specific shape. In particular, one may want to 
check whether such distribution follows a power-law distribution as found in many 
real life cases. Although statistical estimation methods have been developed to test 
such laws, we use here the simplest method available and check it visually by 
employing logarithmic scales.   42
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Distribution of price changes over 2000 periods 
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As apparent on Graph 7.1, this does not seem to be the case for Variant 1 as the 
probability always shows some curvature. This might not be really astonishing given 
that when trading on an organized market, settlements usually take place only at the 




Distribution of price changes over 1000 periods 



















On the contrary, under Variant 2, some segments of the cumulative probability 
distribution appear more linear as apparent on Graph 7.2.  43
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Distribution of price changes over 
2000 periods 
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Section 5 
MONEY, ITS LEGAL FRAMEWORK, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
CASH CONTRAINTS 
 
What are the incentives of agents to either keep applying the rules of collective 
behavior which often implicitly underlie given models or to reject and possibly 
improve them? This question is rarely asked in general equilibrium models. Indeed, it 
is often assumed that markets are complete and the associated optimality makes the 
question irrelevant.  Moreover, assuming one representative agent makes it difficult to 
envisage that diverging interests may jeopardize the structure of the economy and lead 
to its impairment or to the absence of improvements if needed.  
Answering such question is much more natural with two agents whose rational 
interests may diverge and the possibility of their divergence either lead to the 
disappearance of markets or prevents their creation. Indeed, our model and its 
“stationary expectations” equilibrium solutions as described and simulated earlier are 
associated to several implicit assumptions. First, markets envisaged by both Variant 1 
and 2 are functioning as described in Section 2. This implies that agents do not have 
the possibility to choose between Variants. Second, agents cannot refuse to trade 
together. Third, they cannot improve any of the two variants by creating new markets, 
new financial products, or new institutions like banks. 
However, to the extent that agents in this model are fully rational and able to make the 
same calculations as presented in this article, it cannot be excluded that, at any point 
in time, they compare their current welfare with the level of welfare that they would 
expect to attain in another model or in another variant. For instance, at any point in 
time, they may compare their current level of expected welfare with the level which 
would be reached if they decided at that point in time to restart history and for 
instance live in autarky forever, like the representative agent from a Lucas-Stokey 
model with the same endowment and without bond markets. This would constitute 
financial regression. Such comparison may happen at the very start of the day, when 
agents do not yet know t s , the shock of the day, or later when  t s  is known but 
purchases are not carried out yet.  
Alternatively, if they are living in the Variant 1 model, they may consider whether 
they would like to jointly create a net clearing system so as to restart history in 
Variant 2 assuming this change of market rules would be costless. Finally, they may 45
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compare their situation with the one they would have in a specific Arrow-Debreu 
model in which agents are allowed to trade as securities and before the start of history, 
the same endowment processes they receive in Variants 1 and 2. To the extent that the 
equilibrium generated by this model is simple enough to be reproduced within our 
model with the creation of one insurance market, this last model is representative of 
most possible potential financial developments in the very simplified economy that 
underlies Variants 1 or 2.   
 
Defining and simulating various experiments 
In order to make such comparisons, I simulate the models with the same parameters as 
in Section 4 and calculate each agent’s expected welfare in each of the above cases. 
Then I discuss the likely preferences of agents depending on the partition of money in 
order to assess whether they would prefer to restart history in a changed context and, 
if so, what kind of fine would obviate such preference and hence make the model 
solution fully consistent .  
While models with competitive centralized markets and rational expectations are   
criticized (or praised) by some for systematically generating systemic risk while 
promising “Arrow-Debreu type equilibria”", the purpose here is to check whether 
equilibriums are Pareto-optimal or whether they need to be made so by creating legal 
incentives. Somehow, this is equivalent to making agents not only participate in one 
variant of the model but also play a game in which the two agents, having full 
information on each other may envisage to move together to the Arrow-Debreu model 
or may decide to move individually to the Autarky model, thus forcing the other agent 
to a similar move. In such context, identifying legal incentives avoiding financial 
regression is essential. 
This excludes that agents find compromises of their own improving on or avoiding 
regression to other models, for instance as a result of an “invisible hand” or of a Coase 
theorem. However, as the Autarky and the Arrow –Debreu model belong to the main 
alternatives, it is useful to examine how likely shifts to them in a game with a limited 
set of possible models are. This may either help the “invisible hand” assess the 
importance of the work to be done in order to suggest an agreement between agents or 
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In order to calculate the level of welfare in the economy represented by our model, we 
estimated the expected utility of each agent at period t before he/she learns about the 
state of the world  t s and dependant on its wealth as represented by his money 
holdings: 
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We also calculated such expected utility once the agent knows about the state of the 
world and can anticipate his/her consumption:            











t i t t i I c U E c U s m W β              (5.2) 
More precisely, for each of these partitions, we randomly drew 100 processes of 100 
random shocks each. Then we calculated the discounted utility generated by each of 
these processes for each of the two agents evaluated at time t. Then, following a 
Monte-Carlo approach, we calculated the mean of these 100 utilities in order to obtain 
an estimate of the expected utility of each agent for each original money partition. 
Finally, we calculated the economy expected welfare for each of these partitions by 
simply adding up the expected utilities of the two agents, thereby giving equal 
weights to each agent. This is done under Variant 1 and Variant 2.  We also calculated 
the expected utilities generated by autarky and our specific Arrow-Debreu economy. 
Given the simplicity of the stochastic environment chosen, calculations of  ) (m W
Au
i  
and ) (m W
AD
i were easy. In the autarky case, each agent may be considered as living in 
a monetary model similar to ours, but with one representative agent only instead of 
two. Moreover, each of these representative agents is forbidden to trade with the other 
representative agent. Hence, in the case of autarky,  
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In the Arrow-Debreu case, all markets exist and agents can therefore trade their future 
endowments. As securities on the endowments defined by our choice of Ȇ and XSI 
can only have equal value at time t before the state in t and in following periods are 
known, the wealth of our two agents are identical. The equilibrium will therefore 
generate equal and constant consumption for both agents. Consequently, 
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If however, the agents consider to go to an Arrow-Debreu set up only after they know 
their current state and their current consumption, they would consume their 
consumption and              
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  General welfare in the 4 types of economies is presented on Graph 8. Here, the 
general welfare is calculated by simply adding the expected utility of the two agents. 
As expected, the Arrow-Debreu model is the best performer. Variant 1 dominates 
Variant 2 in all cases where money partition has reached its long term range in 
Variant 1. But Variant 2 dominates when agents start with extreme money partitions. 
It is important however to note that the interval on which Variant 2 is collectively 48
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preferable to Variant 1 does not intersect with the interval [ Min m , Max m ]. Finally the 
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However, considering welfare individually allows for a more precise analysis and 
leads to different results. In Graph 9.1, two elements stand out. First, in Variant 1, at 
the beginning of each period before the current shock is known, autarky is preferable 
to one of the agents whenever the partition of money does not belong to the range 
[0.28, 0.72]. This range is narrower than the range  ] , [ Max Min m m  which is equal to 
[0.25, 0.75]. Hence, even after the partition has converged to its long term range, it 
may well reach the range [0.25, 0.28[, where agent A may prefer autarky or the range 
]0.72,0.75], where agent B may also prefer autarky. On the basis of the probability 
distribution presented in the previous chapter (Graph 3.1), this could happen in 1 out 
of 5 periods.  
Second, the move to an Arrow-Debreu model, i.e. the creation of a more advanced 
financial system, will  be seen as favorable by both agents only when money partition 
belongs to [0.4, 0.6], i.e. 40 percent of the time (see Graph 3.1 again or Table 2 
below). These elements have consequences both from a legal viewpoint and from a 
financial development viewpoint as will be seen later. By contrast, these difficulties 49
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do not arise with Variant 2 which is always Pareto superior to Autarky and Pareto 
inferior to Arrow-Debreu (see Graph 9.2). Hence, finding support for financial 
development in the context of Variant 2 should not be a problem.  
 
Welfare in Variant 2 versus Autarky and Arrow-Debreu 
































However, shifting from Variant 1 to Variant 2 or the contrary does not seem so 
natural, as reflected by Graph 9.3.  Whatever the partition of money, one of the agents 
does not have interest in abandoning the cash-in-advance model for a cash-at-the-end-
of the-day model.. Moreover, the likelihood of visiting 0.5, the only money partition 
where the levels of welfare of the two agents is very close, is very small, as apparent 
both on Graphs 3 and 3’.  
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Reasoning by analogy, one may identify Variant 1 to gross payment systems and 
Variant 2 to net payment systems. This leads to the conclusion that it may be difficult, 
as experienced historically, to replace net payments systems by gross payment 
systems without official interventions. Alternatively, one may identify Variant 1 to an 
over-the-counter market and Variant 2 to an integrated centralized market. One may 
conclude again that it may also be difficult to integrate without official interventions 
over-the-counter operations into one integrated centralized market. 
 
The legal framework of Variants 1 and 2: Is a Legal Tender status needed? 
 
As apparent in Graph 9.1, for money partitions between 0.25 and 0.28 or between 
0.72 and 0.75 and under Variant 1, one of the two agents may prefer autarky to paying 
back the collective debt represented by money. As apparent in Graph 3, this agent 
knows that, in a situation where the amount of money he/she owns is particularly low, 
his endowment might be higher than what his cash constraint will let him/her afford. 
As a result, the price of the unique good will fall to a low level at which he/she will 
have to sell anyway. Moreover, this interest for autarky may increase when he/she 
learn about the state t s  of the day. As apparent in Graph 10, when agent B learns that 
its endowment in state 0 is high and the money he/she holds is limited, his/her interest 
is clear in the absence of further incentive: He/she prefers autarky given that the level 
of income insurance he/she gets from the possession of money is too limited.  
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Therefore, the effect of introducing money in the economy is not as straightforward as 
suggested by models like Townsend (1980) or Manuelli and Sargent (1988) who 
limited themselves to specific money partitions. This phenomenon may explain the 
non-monetization or demonetization of some economies, either in developing 
countries or in the European Middle Ages where money partition often became very 
uneven across agents or regions due to historical developments and was followed by 
the disappearance of former currencies.  
Making the rational equilibrium of Variant 1 sustainable may therefore imply a law on 
the legal tender status of money or on the functioning of markets
14. This law needs to 
affect the incentives of agents to choose between autarky and Variant 1 when the 
partition of money becomes too unequal. In other words, in order to keep the market 
in Variant 1 operational, agents must be fined or punished if they refuse to keep 
participating into the centralized market of Variant 1 The fine or punishment itself 
must be sufficient in order to have them prefer Variant 1 to autarky without affecting 
their incentives in terms of trading. The simplest solution is to tax any agent seeking 
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= Max{(15.22261-15.05499); 14.79896-15.47471} = 0.16762, which corresponds to 
about 1/100 of the overall wealth of the agent.. 
 
By contrast, the need for a law on the legal status of money does not manifest itself 
under Variant 2. This difference across Variants might be an important qualification 
also to Kiyotaki and Moore, which assumes payment at the end-of-the-day like in 
Variant 2. Indeed, introducing money under the form of banknotes with a cash-in-
                                                 
14 The term “legal tender” may be viewed by some as inappropriate as it usually characterises the 
payment of debts across agents which in this model do not exist formally. 52
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advance-constraint may be more difficult when a net payment system or a banking 
system does not facilitate it. It should be recognized however that this supposes the 
existence of techniques and costs which are not taken into account here. 
 
Financial development and Money 
 
These elements also show that financial development is also dependant on the 
distribution of money and the degree of equality among agents. Under Variant 1, 
shifting to the Arrow-Debreu environment is Pareto superior only when the money 
partition is between 0.4 and 0.6, i.e about 40 percent of the time. Moreover, if making 
such a reform takes time, the dynamics of money partition decreases the likelihood of 
a continuous agreement to carry out financial development.  In Table 2 below, one 
calculates how often financial development may happen under continuous Pareto-
superiority over 1 to 6 periods. If reforms need 6 periods to be carried out, the 
likelihood of financial development  occurring once over 1000 periods falls to less 
than ½  percent. Under Variant 2 by contrast, this is always possible.  
 
Table 2 
How likely is it that money partition stays N periods in a row 
between 0.4 and 0.6?                                          (in percent) 
N=1  N=2  N=3  N=4  N=5  N=6 
39.70% 8.30% 3.60% 1.70% 0.90% 0.40%
 
.  
However, shifting from Variant 1 to Variant 2 or the reverse is not easy either, as 
noticed before. Therefore, in a heterogeneous world with monetary frictions, 
excessive inequalities and variability in the partition of money may delay financial 
development. As the range of money partitions where our specific Arrow-Debreu 
equilibrium is Pareto-superior to the cash-in-advance equilibrium is limited, barring 
any redistribution of ownership rights, it may often be difficult for authorities of a 
given country to gather the political support necessary to open new financial markets: 
such markets make obsolete the advantages of some of the country agents.  
In that context, it may be useful to note that the creation of net clearing techniques as 
available under Variant 2 may appear from a collective viewpoint as more valuable 53
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than reflected by the calculation of general welfare in Graph 8. Variant 2 is valuable 
not only because it diffuses systemic risk while avoiding the need for legislation but 
also because it accelerates financial development. By contrast, the creation of a legal 
incentive to stabilize Variant 1 may be suboptimal from a long term prospective if it 
makes financial development too uncertain. We will come back to this issue after 
dealing with systemic risk in the next subsection. 
 
Systemic risk and money in the absence of  banks and other financial markets 
 
Under Variant 1, an absence of legal tender status for the currency may lead to the 
disappearance of the corresponding equilibrium. This implies also that, should some 
characteristic of Variant 1 evolve unexpectedly, it might be important to adapt this 
legal status and, in particular, the fines avoiding attempts by the two agents to go to 
autarky. This allows the joint set of models considered, i.e Variant 1, Autarky and 
Arrow-Debreu to generate some systemic risk even though in each of them, agents 
have rational expectations. 
Systemic risk exists when the occurrence of a given event has the consequence that 
the functioning of the economy is durably altered and overall welfare is durably 
reduced (see Aglietta and Moutot (1993) and CGFS(2010)) This can only happen in 
our suite of models if one of the agents prefers autarky and cannot be discouraged 
from doing so by an appropriate legal constraint. 
 
Money Partition under Variant 1 for beta=0.9
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Let us therefore assume that the economy is well described by Variant 1 as defined 
above and that a legal tender status envisages fines up to 0.16762 units of utility 
making this cash-in-advance economy perfectly stable and rational under its usual 
endowments.  
But let us imagine also that at a given point in time, while the partition of money is 
close to 0.5, the endowments of one of the two agents, agent B, unexpectedly shifts 
from alternating between 3 and 7 units of goods to alternating between 5 and 9. As 
shown in Graph 11, this leads to a new equilibrium in which money partition  starts 
oscillating between two new values of  Min m  and  Max m  now forming the range [0.23, 
0.64] which is narrower than the preceding range [0.25, 0.75]. 
Let us assume that the authorities do not adjust immediately the fines associated to the 
legal tender status. If money partition reaches 0.64, the utility of agent B will switch 
from 18.7449 to 19.03331 if he/she shifts to autarky, implying that a higher fine, 
precisely a fine of at least 0.288408 units of utility is needed to protect the economy 
against systemic risk. If the fine however remains limited to 0.16762 units of utility, 
the temptation to switch to autarky will exist for Agent B for all money partitions in 
the range [0.515, 0.64] as apparent from Graph 12.  A systemic event may therefore 
happen about 14% of the time and lead to an overall average loss of general welfare 
of 0.938788. 
 
Welfare under Variant 1
with endowment of Agent B reaching 5 and 9 units
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Hence, a systemic risk may appear and manifest itself in a model with centralized 
markets and  rational expectations whenever financial frictions create the need for a 
legal environment and this legal environment does not evolve in due time, i.e. does 
not adjust quickly enough to unexpected changes of  the endowment process. Let us 
note moreover that this example increases the inequality of endowments across agents 
from 7/3 to 9/3 and that such inequality is directly related to the need to strengthen 
regulation. This example may thus provide a practical and relatively simple 
illustration of the link made by Rajan (2010) between inequality and systemic risk in 
his book called “Fault Lines”. 
 
Systemic risk as an occasion to foster financial development 
 
Finally, it may be interesting to clarify that a systemic event may be an occasion to 
foster financial development, if used adequately. Indeed, suppose that the economy is 
under Variant 1 and therefore chances that financial development proceeds are as 
described by Table 2, i.e. financial development is very unlikely. It may be rational 
for a government to refuse repairing the legal system as suggested above. 
 
Indeed, if the authorities only offer to their two types of agents the possibility of a step 
to Variant 2 instead of a repair of the legal framework of Variant 1, the immediate 
level of expected welfare of the economy will in aggregate be immediately reduced as 
apparent on Graph 8. But the chances of improving this less efficient economy in the 
time needed to shift from Variant 2 to the Arrow-Debreu model will increase to 
100%. The overall loss of welfare generated by a shift from Variant 1 to Variant 2 is 
much smaller than the benefit of shifting in a few periods to the Arrow-Debreu, as 
apparent on Graph 9.2. Hence, such a fall is, in the end, preferable to a return to the 
low likelihood of financial development reflected by Table 2.  One could even think 
that mischievous or Machiavellian authorities would be glad to let systemic risk occur 
whenever they are sure of their ability to move in a short period of time from Variant 
1 to Arrow-Debreu through Variant 2. This is in line with a Schumpeterian view of 
the world: as crises are necessary to development, no crisis should be wasted. 56
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Two versions of a small model with two agents, money, rational expectations and 
non-continuously binding cash constraints have been presented and simulated. 
Together they show that the introduction of heterogeneous agents and cash constraints 
in DSGE models may play an important role in helping answer questions like: How 
does the introduction of financial frictions affect the link between money and prices? 
Also, does it affect financial development? In particular, it makes it possible to 
consider and describe systemic risk in the context of a model with rational 
expectations. Systemic risk appears as the risk that agents may want to shift across 
general equilibrium models as a result of Pareto-comparisons. Hence, the reason for 
the risk of a systemic event is identified although no full description of systemic 
events is provided as the model does not consider precisely how the shift from 
equilibrium to the next actually takes place across time.  
This approach constitutes in my view a relatively sound basis to model such specific 
events as systemic events. Having clarified the incentives for shifts in case they are 
unexpected and agents are rational, making other hypotheses, in particular on the role 
of behavioral characteristics in the short term when such events take their actual shape 
would in my view become natural and logical. Indeed, starting a study of systemic 
risk with assuming rational expectations does not imply that the study should stop 
there and that agents should necessarily and always be deemed rational or financial 
frictions other than cash constraints should be neglected. Other assumptions may have 
to be considered in parallel to rational expectations. However, rational expectations 
should remain as a reference, all the more that, as shown above, they can in 
combination with heterogeneity generate both highly variable distributions of wealth 
as well as systemic risk. 
Finally, because an approach making reference to rational expectations on the one 
hand and distinguishing “normal equilibriums” from “financially-developed” or 
“regressive” equilibriums creates the possibility to separate systemic events from their 
genesis, it creates many more possibilities for underlying assumptions to be proven 
wrong through both studies of long term datasets of wealth and price dynamics and 
studies of systemic events. Because this approach is therefore more easily refutable 
or, to use the terminology of Karl Popper (1934) “falsifiable”, it is more likely in my 57
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view to support joint and faster progress in the studies of systemic risk and of macro-
economic models.   
A long way remains however before macro-economists may use such models for 
practical purposes. Obviously, the mathematical and computational difficulties 
associated to such models are important and largely condition their use. The 
combination of heterogeneity with frictions makes the issue of compactness of the 
corresponding functional operators and of the existence of their fixed points essential 
and at the same time very complex. Moreover, such models also generate questions on 
how to deal rationally with complexity and the difficulty for agents to solve and use 
such models.  
 However, such study may help in many fields of high relevance to policy makers. 
Legal frameworks necessary to obviate systemic risks and more generally support 
financial stability may be better assessed with recourse to such type of modeling. 
Financial development/regression also may benefit as well as the associated 
regulatory issues. More generally, modeling together heterogeneity and financial 
frictions to measure their impact on the transmission process of monetary policies 
depends on the mastering of techniques associated to such models. One may therefore 
wonder whether a special effort should not be made, for instance by central banks, in 
view of supporting their development. In my view, even such simple models as the 
one presented in this paper can go some way in integrating the views and experience 
of the so-called “econo-physicists” into macro-economics.  58
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Why use cash-in-advance and cash-at-the-end–of-the-day constraints 
when a number of economists have seriously questioned their use? 
 
Arguably, the models which offer the best micro-foundations to the use of money are 
mostly based on matching and search theory. For instance, it is sometimes alleged that 
cash-in-advance constraints would have weak micro-economic foundations as they 
would only detract from an efficient equilibrium while the matching and search 
approach would show how money can only elevate the welfare of society. Also, it is 
often mentioned that models, while having sound micro-economic foundations, 
should be easily tractable (Wallace and Wright 2009). Indeed, even the simplest cash 
constraint, the cash-in-advance constraint "à la Clower" (1967) leads to non-linearity 
that make models difficult to solve.  
However, search theory usually includes reference to islands rather than the actual 
environment of our economies and addresses long-term rather than short-term 
developments in finite period models. It is therefore useful to consider models with 
the ability to produce and match time series like those with infinitely lived agents and 
cash constraints. Also, many turnpike or island models are very similar to cash-in-
advance models. The model in this paper for instance is a stochastic generalization of 
the Townsend (1980) turnpike model. Moreover, in most modern societies, the most 
obvious feature of money is that money conditions the purchase of goods or services 
and the payback of debts. Cash constraints express exactly this fact and modern 
macro-theory faced with repeated financial crises cannot anymore ignore the 
importance of liquidity constraints. Furthermore, making theory dependant on 
mathematical simplicity rather than its ability to match reality is highly debatable. If 
all models were both mathematically tractable and a good description of reality, 
would the calculation of all possible contingencies not be easily done and therefore 
taken into account by authorities? Hence, could systemic risk exist? Moreover, several 
equations used in physics still have no general solutions but are still considered 
relevant. So why not accept their use in economics?  
Indeed, while other modeling strategies have helped consider issues related to the 
inter-action between money and other public paper or between money and the need 59
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for banks or clearing systems, they have not allowed for the creation of infinite time 
series or are also associated with controversial assumptions. Kocherlakota who has 
shown the need for money in order to keep memory of past developments, assumes 
shocks to liquidity preferences (Kocherlakota (2002)), when envisaging such issues. 
Freeman (1995) considers clearing systems, non-continuously binding constraints and 
their consequences for monetary policy but uses an overlapping-generations model 
forbidding the contemplation of short-term dynamics.  
Finally, the issue of the respective role of money and bank credit is confronted by 
Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), who argue that bank credit would be in principle, more 
efficient than money as a means of transaction, were it not for credit risk and propose 
interesting explanations to some interest rates puzzles under the assumption that 
markets are complete. However, they thereby renounce to explain financial 
development. Their modeling strategy does not allow them to examine under which 
conditions a well integrated economy with money and price-taking rather than 
bargaining, with no banks or financial markets, would want to add financial markets, 
and/or clearing systems to money. Moreover, they do not prove the existence of a 
solution to the cash-at-the-end-of-the day constraints they use. By contrast, Hansen 
and Imrohorglu (1992) followed by a large literature summarized by Hausner and 
Heer (2004), introduce populations of heterogeneous and infinitely-lived agents with 
cash constraints. But they use them to see how their distribution allows their overall 
behavior to result in stationary macro-economic time-series after iterations which we 
do not study. 
Overall, using cash constraints to study issues like money demand or money velocity 
stability, financial development or regression, their accompanying legal apparatus and 
the occurrence of systemic risk is, in my view, a defendable strategy. 60
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Annex 1 
Price regimes in the Cash in advance and Cash-at-the end-of-the-day 
variants of the model 
 
Variant 1: some characteristics of solutions 
 
The following theorem and lemmas were proved in Moutot (1991) in Appendix C. By 
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i U is strictly decreasing,  
ξ θ m h U
a
a ≥
− ) ( 1
1 '  and  ξ θ ) 1 ( ) ( 1




Consequently,  ξ θ ≥ +
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Hence, by definition of h in (1.8),  ) , , , ( ξ θ θ




) ( 1 = h        for all m in [0,1]. 
Reciprocally, suppose that  ) , , , ( ξ θ θ




) ( 1 = h . 62
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By definition of h,  ξ θ ≥ +






b   and   ξ θ ≥ +









Thse two inequalities again imply that: 
) ( ' ξ ξ θ m U a
a ≤  and  ) ) 1 (( ' ξ ξ θ m Ub




Be  a U  (.) and  b U (.) two continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly 
concave utility functions. Be β  strictly superior to 0. 
If there exists “a stationary expectations equilibrium” and if it is such that, 
after a finite number of periods, both agents are always under cash constraint, then: 
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However, ) , ( m s θ being a solution to (1.13), this implies that: 
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ξ ξ β θ ³ =     , ) , ( δ SX m s ⊂ ∀    } , { b a i∈ ∀ . 
However, Lemma 2 implies that if cash constraints are to be binding for all m in (0,1),  
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h under  2 h  as a result of (1.8’).Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition A.1  
Suppose that  log(.) (.) =
i U for all } , { b a i ⊂ . 
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Proof  
Suppose that  log(.) (.) =
i U for all } , { b a i ⊂  
(1.11') defines the three price regimes implied by the model.  
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b θ is by definition positive. 65
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2) If the price regime is  3 h , the proof is identical and the results can be deducted 
by changing a into b and 1 into 1-m. 








a a m h
θ θ ξ







b b m m h
θ ξ








a a m h
θ θ ξ







a a m m h
θ ξ
ξ θ + − =  
















+ − 1  and 
= ) , , ( ξ θ m M )}
1
( , 0 {
h
h m Max a
a
θ
ξ − + = = ) , , ( ξ θ m M )}
1
, 0 { a
a h m Max
θ





( , 0 { a b a
a
m Max
θ θ θ ξ
ξ
















Suppose that  log(.) (.) =
i U for all } , { b a i ⊂ Any solution to (1.13’) for which prices 
are well defined is such that: 
-at least for one s in S, prices are determined by  4 h  or  3 h   for m=0. 
-at least for one s in S, prices are determined by  4 h  or  2 h  for m=1.. 
 
Proof 
Suppose prices are, for 0 = m , defined under  2 h  for all s in S. 
Then by Proposition A.1,  )) ( ), 0 , ( , 0 ( ' s s M m
• •
= ξ θ  is equal to 0 for all s in S. 66
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As Lagrangians are always positive or nil,  ) 0 , (s
b θ as well as ) 0 , (s
a θ  can only be nil 
for all s in S. This makes prices at m=0 undefined. Consequently, there must be some 
s in S such that h is determined under  4 h  or  3 h . 
 
Symmetrically, if h is under h3 and m’ is equal to 1,   
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and conclusions are identical. 












=0 which implies that h is also under h2 (respectively h3)  and hence 
prices are again undefined. . Consequently, there must be some s in S such that h is 





Suppose that  log(.) (.) =
i U for all } , { b a i ⊂ .Suppose that ) , ( m s θ  is a Variant 2 
solution to (1.13) such that cash constraints are always binding for one of the agents at 
least.  
Then, for any given s in S,  67
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either  )) ( ), , ( , ( s m s m h ξ θ  =) ) ( ), , ( , ( 2 s m s m h
b b ξ θ  for all m in [0,1], 
or  )) ( ), , ( , ( s m s m h ξ θ =) ( ), , ( , ( 3 s m s m h
a a ξ θ  for all m in [0,1]. 
 
Proof 
Suppose that cash constraints are always binding for one of the agents at least. Then h 
is always under h2 or h3 and not under h4. Then, suppose that, for a given s in S, at 
least one point  0 m  in ]0,1[ exists such that in the left (respectively right) 
neighborhood of   0 m : 
)) ( ), , ( , ( s m s m h ξ θ  =) ) ( ), , ( , ( 2 s m s m h
b b ξ θ  
while in the right (respectively left) neighborhood of a range  0 m ,  
)) ( ), , ( , ( s m s m h ξ θ =) ( ), , ( , ( 3 s m s m h
a a ξ θ . 
 
  Then, by Proposition A.1, and in view of the continuity in m of  ) , ( m s θ  and the fact 
that the functions  (.,.,.) h can only take one value at a time,  
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+ −   for  0 m  in [0,1]  
. However, applying Proposition A.1 again,   0 )) ( ), , ( , ( 0 0 = s m s m M ξ θ  and 1 which is 
a contradiction.  
Hence, for a given s in S,   
Either  )) ( ), , ( , ( s m s m h ξ θ  =) ) ( ), , ( , ( 2 s m s m h
b b ξ θ  for all m in [0,1],  
Or  )) ( ), , ( , ( s m s m h ξ θ =) ( ), , ( , ( 3 s m s m h






Suppose that  log(.) (.) =
i U for all } , { b a i ⊂ . Suppose also that  ) ' , ( s s π  is a two-state 
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If a Variant 2 solution to (1.13) exists and is such cash constraints are always binding 
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Let us apply Theorem 2 to the case of only two states in S. By assumption h is under 
4 h . Hence, there must be  1 s  in S such that h is under  2 h  for m=1 and  2 s in S such that 
h is under  3 h  for m=0. Moreover, applying Proposition  A.2,  1 s cannot be equal to  2 s . 
Hence there must exist:  
1 s  in S such that  )) ( ), , ( , ( 1 1 s m s m h ξ θ  =) ) ( ), , ( , ( 1 1 2 s m s m h
b b ξ θ  for all m in [0,1], and  
2 s in S such that  )) ( ), , ( , ( 2 2 s m s m h ξ θ =) ( ), , ( , ( 2 2 3 s m s m h
a a ξ θ  for all m in [0,1]. 
Moreover,  0 )) ( ), , ( , ( 1 1 = s m s m M ξ θ  and  1 )) ( ), , ( , ( 2 2 = s m s m M ξ θ . 
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Applying Lemma 1’, for s’=1,  )) ( ), , ( , ( 1 1 s m s m h ξ θ  =) ) ( ), , ( , ( 1 1 2 s m s m h
b b ξ θ  implies  69
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Hence,  replacing  and  simplifying,          
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For this to be a solution, it is first necessary for θ  to be positive or nil, i.e 
that 2 1
2 z z k ≥  which implies:  =
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Moreover, it has to be ensured that prices are never defined under  4 h , i.e that:  
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Suppose that  log(.) (.) =
i U for all } , { b a i ⊂ . Suppose also that  ) ' , ( s s π  is a two-state 
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= < ≤ β β and is such that cash constraints are always 
binding for one of the two agents.  
 
Proof  
Applying Proposition A.3, 
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Let us now check the two conditions put forward in Proposition A.3, 
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2 ≤ − + + z z z β β  Roots of this polynomial are  both positive and negative. 72
ECB







) 1 ( 2






= < ≤ β β  
) 2 (
) 2 (































to the same condition. Q.E.D. 
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